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BOOK REVIEW: THE LANGUAGE OF LIvEs
Jill C. Anderson*
For outsiders, perhaps it is the historian's relationship to the
particular that epitomizes the discipline and frames our expectations as
readers. To mine boundless archival sources for shards of a story, and to
fashion those odd individual shapes into a coherent one among many
possible narratives -- this speaks to an intellectual calm beyond the reach of
most of us. Delivering on this expectation, Timothy Alborn's Regulated
Lives: Life Insurance and British Society, 1800-1912 tells a story of a
little-understood institution's path into modernity, assembled of well-
chosen detail on a foundation of comprehensive research.' Importantly,
Alborn's excavation of Victorian life insurance fills gaps in business
history. But its most surprising feature, one that readers glimpse just a few
pages into the book, is the sweep of its conceptual departure point: the
meaning of life. And not just one meaning, but four distinct
conceptualizations of modem life - as he terms them: the sympathetic, the
numbered, the medicalized, and the commodified life2 -- that Alborn argues
evolved during the Victorian era and are uniquely merged in the institution
of life insurance.3
A preliminary project of Alborn's book is to name and strain out
these life-dimensions, in something like the way a prism takes in white
light and separates it into a spectrum.4 He then shows how those bands
came to be braided together, each one developing alongside and in tension
with the others as they shaped Victorian life insurance and in turn were
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I am
grateful to the University of Connecticut's Insurance Law Center and Pat McCoy
in particular for the opportunity to share perspectives on Regulated Lives with
Sharon Murphy, Geoff Clark, and Tom Baker, with Peter Kochenburger
moderating the discussion with his usual expertise and generosity. I owe much to
Susan Schmeiser for teaching me how to read more smartly and sensitively.
Finally, many thanks are due Tim Alborn for giving us this important, lovingly
crafted book to convene around and celebrate.
STIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIvES: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH
SOCIETY, 1800-1914 (2008).
2 Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-13.
4 This metaphor is borrowed from the author, who uses it to depict the
fragmentary nature of modernity and its resistance to being folded into grand
narrative without stranding or jettisoning facts that do not follow its plot. Id. at
296-97.
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shaped by that institution as a producer of culture. As this express project
of the book unfolds, a parallel, subtler plot of sorts develops at a linguistic
level. In breaking out a typology of "lives," the author calls into service a
figure of speech that is ubiquitous in life insurance and in insurance in
general: metonymy, the non-literal use of a word to represent an associated
concept.5 "Lives," in the parlance of insurance, is nearly always shorthand
for something associated with lives: e.g., policy holders, policies, bodies,
medical subjects, breadwinners, health states, predictions of longevity, and,
of course, deaths. In Regulated Lives, Alborn's multiple meanings of "life"
both complicate and organize the underlying, undifferentiated metonym in
ways that mirror certain strange and intriguing paradoxes inherent in life
insurance.
Among the fourfold typology of "lives," we encounter first the
sympathetic lfe. Within this meaning, it is one's contemplation of dying
and leaving others destitute that is essential to the demand for life
insurance,6 and insurers aimed to generate a "sympathetic exchange" with
the public.7 The more impersonal numbered life was the province of the
actuary, who tabulated life expectancies and organized them into mortality
tables. This was the relatively easy task, at least as it reflected mortality for
"healthy males," but actuarial science was considerably more challenged to
convert mortality statistics into meaningful risk categories. While actuaries
were zooming out from persons to numbers to norms (sometimes very far
out, as when seeking in vain an ancient "law of mortality" in the early
nineteenth century),8 medical examiners were focusing closely on
individual bodies. In a break from therapeutic or investigative applications
of medicine, they applied the latest science to scrutinize medicalized lives
for signs of defect that would render them uninsurable. 9 And finally, the
development of these conceptual categories all took place within a
See MERRIAM-WEBSETER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 782 (11th ed. 2003).
Examples of metonymy include "the crown" to represent a monarchy or
"Hollywood" as a stand-in for the American entertainment industry. See id.
6 I mean here to refer to the demand for life insurance as an income substitute
for the breadwinner-insured, as opposed to the class of debtor-insureds for whom
life insurance was a condition of credit. See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 136-37.
Id. at 156 (citing ELAINE HADLEY, MELODRAMATIC TACTICS:
THEATRICALIZED DISSENT IN THE ENGLISH MARKETPLACE, 1800-1885 30-31
(1995).
8 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 124.
9Id. at 205-51.
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rationalizing market that equated mortality with money, giving us the
commodified lfe.o
Anyone who doubts that these categories work beyond
characterizing British life insurance should consider the recent public
controversy over guidelines for breast cancer screening through
mammography." When a federally appointed medical advisory panel
recommended delaying routine mammograms, citing a low likelihood that
more aggressive screening would save lives in significant number, 12 the
ensuing public debate echoed the tensions that Alborn has identified, in
another life-and-death context. Both might be characterized as sympathy
meets medicine meets math meets money. 13
These four conceptualizations of life might appear to be
interrelated as natural allies or rivals with their tensions following
predictable plotlines. Sympathy, for example, stands apart as humanizing
life insurance, defining certain essential relations that must hold between
the insurer and the insured (can the policyholder trust the insurer to be a
surrogate breadwinner?) and between that insured and his dependants (is
the policyholder sensitive enough to their plight to pay premiums for their
benefit alone?). Symbolized in literature by the Victorian deathbed, 14 the
perspective of sympathy recognizes the policyholder as an individual with
complex relationships and responsibilities, in contrast to the other three
more objectifying dimensions.'s And just as the deathbed motif has given
way in to its contemporary equivalent, the hospital bed, we might anticipate
a story of life insurance's "softer feelings" losing ground to the cold
rationality of the mortality table or the scrutiny of the medical examination
table.
A more complex dynamic emerges in Regulated Lives, however,
notably in the chapter on the gatekeeping practices, by which insurers
excluded or charged higher premiums based on risk. Insurers in the early
to mid-nineteenth century screened applicants based on interviews,
referrals, and a proposal form.16  Early gatekeeping was largely
10 Id. at 18 1.
" Tom BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 158-59 (2d. ed. 2008).
12 d
13 For commentary on the controversy over mammograms see, e.g., Kevin
Sack, Screening Debate Reveals Culture Clash in Medicine, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
2009, at Al.
14 ALBORN, Supra note 1, at 149.
1 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 156.
6 Id. at 232.
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interpersonal, intuitive, and trust-based; in other words, "intimate but
unreliable."' 7 With a widening market, a burgeoning field of diagnostic
medicine, and growing mistrust of the truthfulness of applicants, insurers
by 1900 had come to rely chiefly on medical examinations to police
adverse selection.' 8 A triumph for the medicalized conception of life? Not
so fast. The indignity of the medical exam made it unpopular with
consumers and sales agents alike.19 Products that dispensed with the exam
gained favor in the early 1900s, striking a blow for sympathy as mediated
through the market.
Another surprising relationship emerges in the tension between
numbered and medicalized conceptions of life, two dimensions of science
that appear from a distance to reinforce each other. Starting from the
baseline of confident mortality tables, it seemed to insurers that diagnostic
medicine could be brought into the service of actuarial science. Medicine
held the prospect of refining the sweepingly general mortality statistics by
introducing meaningful risk categories. Once having identified the markers
of mortality, the medical gaze could be trained on the individual body in
order to screen out or rate up "inferior lives," or so insurers hoped.
But bodies do not give up "Fate's secrets" 20 easily, we learn, either
individually or in the aggregate. This was true in two senses. First, being
"poked and prodded" made people uneasy enough when undertaken by an
attending physician for the purpose of treatment; swapping the attendant
with the "medical police" 21 and replacing therapy with evaluation only
made the scrutiny more objectionable. Second, many features that were
deemed abnormal (e.g., a lanky build,22 albumin in the urine,23 etc.) turned
out to be of little use as predictors of mortality. It made sense that insurers
screened for lung problems in a period of rampant tuberculosis, but even
some of this attention was misplaced, as when insurers took chest
circumference and breathing capacity as a measure of respiratory health.24
Much of Victorian gatekeeping of the medicalized life calls to mind the
saw of "looking for one's lost keys under the lamppost": insurers tended to
collect information on deviance that was easy to detect (e.g., epilepsy,
"Id. at 241.
8Id. at 245.
'
9 Id.
20 Id. at 265.
21 Id. at 253.
22 Id. at 263.
23 Id. at 267.
24 Id. at 263.
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insanity, physiognomic judgments), with disappointing results for risk
classification.25 But in the end - and here is the twist wrought by the
numbered conception of life - there was always the law of large numbers.
Medicine might take pains to sniff out pathology in applicants, but as
numbered lives, those applicants were often normal enough to be
insurable. 26 Doctors had arrived at the actuaries' starting point: "the future
could be predicted only for aggregate populations and never for
individuals." 2 7 This nuanced story of medical thinking, counterposed to
statistical thinking, showcases Alborn's typology of "lives" to full effect,
so much that it is hard to imagine how we have been able to talk about life
insurance at all without it up until now.
And how do we talk about life insurance, or insurance more
generally? Metonym is central to the language of insurance, beginning with
its key term, risk. While risk's literal meaning is the possibility of loss, it is
just as often used figuratively to signify the insured: not the actual risk
itself, but the individual associated with risk.28 Nowhere is this semantic
slippage more arresting than in life insurance. Lives in this specialized
context is a reduction of "life" in the sense we ordinarily intend it, a boiling
down of the "noble self' of personhood into the "six sheets of paper" that
interest the insurer.29  Whatever the ordinary meaning of this most
expansive word, anyone not habituated to the language of insurance would
likely find the industry's references to "lives" jarring. Imagine what an
individual might consider to be "prerequisites for 'a model life"' and
compare it to this 1861 medical advisor's list: "absence of scars or
hoarseness, a capacious and symmetrical chest, and 'equable' pulse, and 'a
considerable warmth to the skin."' 30 As one Victorian novelist voiced
through a character, nothing could be "more likely to destroy natural
feeling . . . than to sit down with strangers and reduce his life to the
measure of an insurance table,"31
Alborn adopts the industry-wide usage of "lives," and while he
does not address this aspect of insurance rhetoric outright, he seems to put
25Id. at 227.
26 Id. at 312.
27 Id at 270.
28 BAKER, supra note 11, at 2.
29 For a colorful quotation comparing life insurance underwriting to boiling
down beef into broth, see Alborn, supra note 1, at 220.
'
0 Id. at 269.
31 Id. at 147 (citing Edward G. Bulwer-Lytton, My Novel, 72 BLACKWOOD'S
MAG. 53-54 (1852)).
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the tension between it and a more ordinary meaning of "life" in play, and
playfully so, on the book's cover. "Regulated Lives," on its own might
suggest to a bookstore browser an account of the ways that the activities of
living are governed. But quite the opposite of activity is the focus of life
insurance, which might at least as accurately have been termed "death
insurance." 32 Not only does the title put a twist on "life" as we know it, it
sets up an ambiguity in and on the book's terms. We may read these plural
lives as those belonging to the Victorians themselves, 33 or as the four
conceptual categories (the four "lives") that organize this history and that,
in a sense, regulate one another.
Thus the word "life" has many lives in this book, depending on
which strand of modernity we are tracing. Sympathetic lives are lives
entrusted to insurers. Numbered lives are counted lives and measured
lives, with longer lives subsidizing shorter lives, or else ominously logged
in a Registry of Declined Lives. Medicalized lives are screened lives,
healthy lives, hazardous lives, or lives "looking sickly and indifferent."
And commodified lives are marginal, good, select, under-average, first
class or doubtful, and lives that sometimes lapse (which of course does not
entail death; rather, they just fade away and fail to pay premiums). It
seems the one thing that lives are not, or at least not with any salience, is
lived.
Through its typology of life-senses, Regulated Lives casts
insurance as a technology that slices up the meaning of "life" and
recombines the conceptual strands into new forms - a semiotic, nineteenth-
century tranching and bundling of sorts. There is something
psychologically odd about life insurance, though, that complexity alone
does not capture. In order to insure our lives we must contemplate death . .
. for the purpose of not having to think about the ramifications of death. In
contemplating, we overcome denial of death's inevitability and
unpredictability, yet we insure precisely in order to deny death its full
force, to bring some of death's aftermath into check. In the final pages of
Regulated Lives, Alborn captures the paradox of life insurance in the darkly
incisive musings of Gregory, the insurance clerk in Julian Barnes's novel,
Staring at the Sun: "[W]hen it came down to it, what people were trying to
do was get the best deal they could out of being dead . .. Even those who
admitted that they themselves would not actually get the money could still
be entranced by the transaction." 34 Gregory concludes of insureds that
32 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 163.
3 See id at 7 ("Yet the regulated lives who bought insurance policies . . .
34 Id. at 311 (citing JuLIAN BARNES, STARING AT THE SUN 110-11 (1986)).
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"when departing, they struck the best deal they could. How strange. How
admirable, he supposed, but how strange."35 This strangeness is what many
of us find fascinating about life insurance, and about this book. Perhaps it
derives from the fact that, no matter which strand of its meaning we are
tracing, we are always looking at the death side of life.
35id
2010 445
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REVIEW OF TIMOTHY ALBORN'S
REGULATED LIvEs
Sharon Murphy*
One of the most important recurring themes in Timothy
Alborn's Regulated Lives: Life Insurance and British Society, 1800-
1914 is the idea of Victorian gatekeeping, meaning the use of
application forms, statistical tables, and medical exams to carefully
select only those lives that conformed to a company or industry-
defined standard norm.' As Alborn demonstrates, this process of
determining who would be permitted to join a company's pool of
policyholders and at what rate of premium was fraught with anxiety
not only for the applicant, but likewise for the medical doctors, sales
agents, and company directors, each of whom had a stake in the
success or failure of the gatekeeping process.2 Yet while individual
decisions regarding individual lives by individual actors were the
public face of gatekeeping, the process was ultimately based on the
definition of a standard normal life in the aggregate. In order both to
reduce underwriting individual lives with an unacceptably higher
than average probability of mortality and to set accurate premium
rates, companies first had to determine average mortality rates for
their target clientele.3 Ironically, for an industry dependent on
actuarial tables during an era when statistical knowledge reigned
supreme, numbers proved to be the Achilles' heel for life insurers.
Victorian gatekeeping publicly promised a rational, scientifically-
based classification of lives, yet privately delivered little more than
educated guesswork with the hope that future mortality would not
prove their estimations to be woefully inadequate.4
* Sharon Ann Murphy is an associate professor of history at Providence
College and the author of Investing in Life: Insurance in Antebellum America,
forthcoming in 2010 from Johns Hopkins University Press.
1 See, e.g., TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVEs: LIFE INSURANCE AND
BRITISH SOCIETY 1800-1914 220 (2009).
2 Id. at 238-39.
3 Id. at 103.
4 Id. at 128, 130.
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The nature of all insurance enterprises is spreading risk
across a large group of people. Thus, the key to operating a
successful, profitable insurance company is to accurately assess the
overall risk of the entire pool of policyholders, and then to set
premium rates which reflect that level of risk. But, as Alborn
demonstrates, this was a particularly vexing problem for British life
insurers. Not only was the process of determining average mortality
much more complex than it might initially appear, but that process
was further confounded by the difficulty of deciding whose mortality
was relevant for compiling those tables: which people actually
belonged to this group of people interested in spreading risks among
themselves.5  If companies could assume that everyone would
purchase a life insurance policy, then this problem of determining a
predicted mortality experience would be greatly simplified, since it
would be based on the mortality of the population as a whole. Yet in
reality, not everyone desired insurance (at least not at first), and
companies initially sought to underwrite only the least risky lives.6
Insurers thus needed to calculate tables based on the expected
mortality experience of their target clientele. And whereas predicting
mortality rates for the overall population was a difficult task, gauging
the future mortality of a significant subset was especially daunting,
not least because the attributes of this group were endlessly shifting.
On the micro level, membership within the target risk pool
was subject to continuous change.7 Insurers had to face the problem
of trying to guarantee that new individuals who joined the group did
not unfavorably impact the aggregate risk profile of the body of
policyholders.8 If a company was excessively selective in accepting
policyholders, it would be in danger of having insufficient lives
across whom to spread the risk adequately. Additionally, an overly
restrictive target group would limit the firm's ability to increase its
market share in the future. Yet by defining the parameters of the
target group more broadly, companies would require even more
precise knowledge of each additional applicant to ensure that the
'Id. at 113.6 Id. at 4.
7See, e.g., ALBORN, supra note 1, at 33-42.
Id. at 220-21, 271-73.
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clientele was not being drawn primarily from the least favorable
portion of the potential risk pool. 9 Likewise, as companies and the
industry inevitably tried to expand the life insurance market, by
necessity they would need to start accepting less desirable lives.
Thus, the industry needed a way to select the best lives (i.e., those
predicted to live the longest among their peers), and then decide how
to treat other applicants who failed to meet this highest of
standards.' 0 This is where Alborn's gatekeeping - the personal
assessment of individual risks - became so crucial.
Unfortunately, shifting parameters for the target risk pool was
not the only hurdle in the development of accurate mortality tables."
Companies were trying to make predictions about mortality twenty,
thirty, even forty years into the future, yet external factors impacting
expected mortality on the macro level were likewise in rapid flux
during the nineteenth century. For example, urbanization facilitated
the spread of disease, industrialization enlarged the number of
hazardous occupations, and transportation innovations encouraged
travel to less salubrious climates; all of these factors increased
mortality rates among certain populations. On the other hand,
improvements in medical knowledge and medical care, better
sanitation, access to fresh foods, etc., were lowering mortality rates
for another subset of the population. Yet these factors did not merely
cancel each other out; rather, they impacted different segments of the
population to differing degrees, making calculations of future
mortality a constantly moving target.
Therefore, the very first problem which life insurers needed
to work out was the computation of accurate mortality tables, and
what is most important to note here is the amount of sheer guesswork
involved in this endeavor throughout the nineteenth century.12 Yet,
at the same time, the entire industry was founded upon the premise
that mortality was governed by scientific laws which were easily
accessed and understood by the trained company actuary.' 3 Firms
9 Id. at 220-21.
oId. at 220.
" See, e.g., id. at 104-05.
12 Id. at 103.
13 ALBORN, supra note I at 134.
2010] 449
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assured the public that they could accurately predict how many
people of a given age would die in a given year, so by purchasing
insurance, the policyholder was merely spreading the risk of his or
her individual death across the aggregate of people of the same age.14
Life insurance advertisements and sales agents were thus adamant
that life insurance was not a matter of gambling, and they pointed to
countless tables of data to buttress this assertion.' 5
Despite their public assertions to the contrary, insurance
executives throughout the nineteenth century were never certain that
they had the right statistical foundation for their premium rates.' 6
They suspected that the available tables based on whole population
data greatly overstated mortality.' 7 Not only did these tables include
many low-income individuals for whom mortality was higher than
average, but they also did not take into account the rigorous selection
process of insurers.!s Yet tables based purely on a company's past
experience (so-called select life tables) were likewise plagued with
problems. In an industry making predictions over the long term,
most companies were too young to draw accurate conclusions from
their limited experience. Although industry executives understood
that the benefits of careful medical selection were short-lived, most
of the policies available for use in a select life table were recently
acquired and thus still benefitting from that selection advantage.
Finally, the crafting of a select life table based on past experience
assumed that all future applicants would be similarly selected, and
that it would not be necessary for the firm to loosen its selection
criteria in attempting to increase its market share. One potential
solution to this problem would be to adopt an overly-conservative
table, returning the excess as bonuses to policyholders in mutual
companies or as dividends to stockholders. Yet this option would
open the door to cut-rate competition from companies employing
more liberal tables. Additionally, many companies sold both life
insurance and life annuities; an overly-conservative mortality
14 Id. at 128.
" Id at 127, 306.
16 Id at 102-103.
"Id. at 115.
" Id at 104.
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schedule would wreak havoc on the annuity business even as it
guaranteed the safety of the insurance line.
By the second half of the nineteenth century, life insurers
(working mainly through the professional organization for British
actuaries) would agree upon a table that they believed would serve as
an acceptable basis for the selection process.19  Based on the
combined experiences of twenty major life insurance offices, this
"Healthy Males" table suffered from many of the same shortcomings
as other select life tables.20 Yet because it was so widely adopted
within the industry, it set the standard for the expected mortality of
healthy males at a given age21 (lessening the problem of cut-rate
competition) 22. All insurance applicants would now be judged based
on their predicted adherence to this norm.23 As data continued to
accumulate, applicants once denied coverage for falling outside the
acceptable risk pool were now embraced, And as mortality risks
shifted, these tables would be repeatedly revised over the remainder
of the century. 24 While the Healthy Males table was still imperfect,
by working together as an industry insurers were finally able to
achieve a reasonably accurate mortality table on which to base their
decisions.25
Of course, in setting the standard normal life of a healthy
male, firms still needed to decide who fit that standard and how to
deal with applicants falling outside of this category such as women,
less than perfectly healthy males, or people exposed to greater
mortality risks due to a dangerous occupation, residence in an
unhealthy climate, or hazardous travel. Thus, even the compilation of
a moderately-accurate mortality table did not eliminate the necessity
of Victorian gatekeeping. 26 Gender, occupation, or travel were all
factors which companies could identify with relative ease, choosing
either to reject the applicant outright or add a surcharge to the risk
19 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 113.
20 d. at 113-14.
21 Id. at 115.
22 Id. at 103.
23 Id. at 276-77.
24 Id. at 284-86.
25 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 114
26 Id. at 220-21.
2010] 451
452 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
(which, as Alborn points out, was often based more on the maximum
that the market could bear rather than an accurate reflection of the
nature of the risk).27 Health issues, on the other hand, were of the
highest concern for the industry, and the greatest efforts at Victorian
gatekeeping were devoted to uncovering hidden health problems.28
British life insurers were obsessed with the possibility that applicants
would engage in adverse selection.2 9 They feared that people with
reason to believe their lives would fall short of the predicted
longevity would be most likely to apply, and that the applicant would
hide this information (either inadvertently or intentionally) from the
company.30
Just as companies struggled throughout the century to
determine an accurate basis for their aggregate mortality tables, they
likewise grappled with the problem of ascertaining the health risk
posed by individual applicants. 3 1 During the first half of the century,
the main means of gatekeeping entailed health questions on an
application form, the corroboration of these answers by reliable
friends and medical attendants, and a personal appearance before the
board of directors.32 However, each of these means contained
serious drawbacks. As companies extended their reach beyond the
metropole, it became increasingly difficult for the board to
personally examine each applicant or to judge the reliability of
witnesses. 33 Additionally, doctors began demanding payment for
their services34, yet their observations were likely to be biased in
favor of their patients.35
Finally, the application form depended first and foremost on
the honesty of the applicant ("has the applicant ever spit blood?").36
Yet even when the policyholder had been completely forthcoming,
271Id. at 116.281d. at 221-22.29 Id. at 221.
3 0 Id. at 220-23.
31 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 220.
3 1 d., at 224-32.
31 Id. at 232, 237.
34 Id. at 222.
3 Id. at 232.361 Id. at 224-25.
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he or she may have had an underlying medical issue that was as of
yet undetected, or a seemingly innocuous symptom that the applicant
failed to associate with a larger medical problem. 37 The desire to
ensure that all policyholders conformed to the "healthy male"
standard set in the tables drove companies to construct ever more
complicated questionnaires, demanding that applicants respond to
multiple queries about numerous specific ailments or symptoms, as
well as providing a detailed family history.38
The gatekeeping of the application form was then reinforced
with a more robust medical examination. 39 Rather than relying on the
information provided by personal doctors, companies began hiring
physicians to conduct detailed screenings of all applicants.40 In order
to facilitate comparisons across applicants and medical personnel,
these exams became increasingly routinized.4 Once again,
companies sought to statistically define what constituted normal
characteristics for their standard healthy male.42  By setting
parameters for acceptable height, weight, pulse, blood pressure, etc.,
life insurers exuded confidence that they understood the statistical
impact of these factors on their standard normal life - and then could
adjust rates accordingly for those who fell outside these parameters.43
Yet as had been the case with the creation of mortality tables, these
guidelines were of necessity a combination of sound medical
knowledge and educated guesswork.4 In attempting to numerically
define and categorize applicants, firms repeatedly found their efforts
thwarted by the uniqueness of individual lives.
In placing so much confidence in the accuracy and objectivity
of statistics, life insurers were part of a much larger nineteenth-
century phenomenon. As Geoffrey Clark already mentioned,
historians such as Patricia Cline Cohen (A Calculating People: The
Spread of Numeracy in Early America. University of Chicago Press,
3 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 221.3 1 Id. at 225-26.
39 Id.at 236.
40 id.
41 Id. at 244.
42 Id. at 261-62.
43 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 261-62.
4 Id. at 270.
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1982), Theodore M. Porter (The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-
1900. Princeton University Press, 1986), and Lorraine Daston (in The
Probabilistic Revolution. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press, 1990) have all documented a rapid increase in the use and
acceptance of statistics in daily life during the early decades of the
nineteenth century. On both sides of the Atlantic, people were
becoming more numerically literate and they increasingly associated
data with objective truths, subjecting to quantification not just
economic questions but civic, social, and moral issues as well. For
the life insurance industry, a statistical understanding of the factors
contributing to mortality would not only ensure the long-term
viability of the industry but would create confidence among the
general public that life insurance premiums were based on
scientifically sound principles and not merely a matter of chance.
Yet their search for statistical surety was, of necessity, elusive.
Regulated Lives reflects not only the nineteenth-century obsession
with numbers and calculation but, more importantly, underscores the
messiness and contingency inherent in that compilation of "objective
truth."
[Vol.16:2
REGULATED LIvEs IN
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT
Geoffrey Clark*
Readers of this journal are likely to be more familiar with the legal
doctrines pertaining to contemporary insurance practice than they are with
the scholarly roots of Timothy Albom's Regulated Lives: Life Insurance
and British Society, 1800-1914.' This essay is meant to provide some
historiographical context in order that readers may appreciate the full
measure of Alborn's achievements in this book.
Regulated Lives is the latest arrival on a tide of historical and
sociological research into insurance appearing in the last 25 years or so.
Although numerous smaller tributaries may be identified, two major
streams of scholarship have led to these studies into the social and cultural
history insurance. The first of these is the company history, a work
typically commissioned by a firm's directors to celebrate the passing of a
noteworthy milestone. All too often, especially among the older sort, these
histories are cast in a heroic Victorian mold, featuring as dramatis
personae the "Great Men" who stood at the company's helm, steadfastly
navigating stormy and shark-filled waters to make their sesqui- or
bicentennial ports. Gratifying tales of profit and endurance for the stock-
holders and employees who must have comprised the main readership of
these volumes, but their aims usually did not reach beyond chronicling the
progress of the firm and celebrating its success.
This is not to denigrate some really first-rate company histories
written by outstanding historians that have documented the rise of the
British insurance business over the past 300 years, works like P. G. M.
Dickson's The Sun Insurance Office (1960)2, Barry Supple's Royal
Exchange Assurance (1970)', and Clive Trebilcock's Phoenix Assurance
(1985)4. But even the best of them, as Albom himself phrases it, mainly
. Geoffrey Clark is a professor of History at the State University of New York
at Potsdam.
1 TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH
SOCIETY, 1800-1914 (2009).
2 P. G. M. DICKSON, THE SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, 1710-1960: THE HISTORY
OF Two AND A HALF CENTURIES OF BRITISH INSURANCE (1960).
3 BARRY SUPPLE, THE ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE: A HISTORY OF BRITISH
INSURANCE 1720-1970 (1970).
4 CLIVE TREBILCOCK, 1 PHOENIX ASSURANCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
BRITISH INSURANCE (1985).
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adopt the perspective of the board room.5 The problem is not just that the
histories of remarkably successful firms must inevitably have a whiggish
whiff. It is also, and more importantly, that while the companies portrayed
in these accounts may suffer boardroom clashes, recalcitrant sales staffs, or
the usual interdepartmental rivalries, the fundamental unit of analysis
remains the firm as a monolithic entity. This perspective was adopted even
by older general histories like Harold Raynes' History of British Insurance
(1964)6, which narrate a story largely bounded by the field lines of
company entrepreneurship, technical innovation, and state regulation.
One of the achievements of Alborn's book is to show at a much
finer level of detail that the nineteenth-century British insurance business
was internally driven by different constituencies working to some extent at
cross-purposes because they attributed to their customers different
ontological or aesthetic meanings: they were sympathetic subjects to the
pitch men, forensic puzzles to medical examiners, numerical data to the
actuaries, and commodities to the ledger-keepers and stockholders. And
not all of these terms could dovetail into a consistent and cohesive, to say
nothing of coercive, address to the insured subject. As a result, Albom
presents a view of the nineteenth-century insurance firm as pluralistic in its
organization and at times internally divided in its goals, and therefore
incapable of formulating and enforcing the micro-strategies of control
imagined by Michel Foucault and the acolytes of "governmentality."8
The second major stream of scholarship leading to Regulated Lives
and other recent studies of insurance flows from the history and philosophy
of science literature on the emergence of probabilistic thinking, the
development of statistical analysis, and the strikingly obsessive and
pervasive reference to number as a legitimating authority in the modern
world. Prominent among researchers in this field are the philosopher Ian
Hacking and historians of science Ted Porter and Lorraine Daston, who are
concerned with describing the epochal mental and intellectual
transformations that were associated with reconceptualizations of chance,
mathematics, and reason from the seventeenth through the twentieth
centuries.9 Although this body of scholarship is impressive in its ambition
ALBORN, supra note 1, at 13-14.
6 HAROLD E. RAYNES, A HISTORY OF BRITISH INSURANCE (2nd ed. 1964).
7 ALBORN, supra note 1, at 7-13.
Id. at 7.
9 See IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUCTION AND STATISTICAL
INFERENCE (2006); THEODORE M. PORTER, THE RISE OF STATISTICAL THINKING,
1820-1900 (photo. reprint 1988) (1986); LORRAINE DASTON & MICHAEL STOLLEIS,
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and scope, and while it has greatly influenced researchers in a variety of
fields, its preoccupation with seismic shifts in the history of ideas
inevitably give short shrift to the nitty-gritty details of how, and to what
extent, probabilism and statistical technique were absorbed into what
Daston refers to as "the practice of risk" in her seminal Classical
Probability in the Enlightenment (1988).1o But it is worth noting that it was
only at the urging of the distinguished historian of science Charles
Gillespie, who thought her initial draft too absorbed in theory in her book,
that Daston added a chapter on the concrete application of probability
theory to risk-taking and insurance.
We have then in these two scholarly streams the truffle-hunting
company historians narrowly focused on the fortunes of the firm, and the
parachutist intellectual historians attentive to shifting conceptual
landscapes but less adept at tracing the details of how probability and
statistics were translated into practical activity. The recent wave of
insurance histories has sought to bridge this gap between the aerialists and
the troglodytes by joining business and economic history with social and
cultural history. Regulated Lives stakes out this new ground for the period
in which Britain's life insurance industry grew to maturity. It stands
alongside Robin Pearson's Insuring the Industrial Revolution: Fire
Insurance in Great Britain, 1700-1850 (2004)" and my own Betting on
Lives: The Culture of Life Insurance in England, 1695-1775 (1999)12 in
providing synthetic studies of the development of the British insurance
market (in most respects the progenitor of the modem insurance business)
while also teasing out the meanings of insurance to various market
participants and in the culture at large.13
In comparing my account of the early formation of the British
insurance market in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with Alborn's
account of its subsequent development across the long nineteenth century,
the continuities in business practice and culture are more striking than the
dissimilarities. This is a surprising result given the widely shared
assumption by experts that the character of life insurance fundamentally
NATURAL LAW AND LAWS OF NATURE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE:
JURISPRUDENCE, THEOLOGY, MORAL AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY (2008).
10 LORRAINE DASTON, CLASSICAL PROBABILITY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT 112
(photo. reprint 1995) (1988).
" ROBIN PEARSON, INSURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: FIRE INSURANCE
IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1700-1850 (2004).
12 GEOFFREY CLARK, BETrING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE
IN ENGLAND, 1695-1775 (1999).
13 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 7-13.
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changed after the foundation, in 1762, of the Equitable Society (the first
firm to issue sell "modern" age-based premium insurance) and the
appearance of several imitators near the end of the eighteenth century.14
Alborn shows that, despite refinements in actuarial knowledge, product
design, marketing, and medical screening, in important respects the life
insurance industry displayed the same tentative reliance on actuarial data
and appealed to the same speculative tastes of its customers as it did in the
previous century.1
Nineteenth-century actuaries, for example, generated a succession
of mortality tables that generally confirmed one another's evaluations of
the risk of death at specified ages - the risk of mortality, that is, among
middle-class adult males, a group that actuaries established as a standard
reference population. 16 It had been obvious to Daniel Defoe as far back as
the 1690s that other factors such as occupation or place of residence were
likely to be at least as important as age in determining the likelihood of
death.'7  150 years later actuaries showed little inclination to compile
mortality tables that quantified those risks or to calculate the mortality
profile for "non-standard" populations like women or the working classes."
Instead, insurers resorted to other techniques for coping with increased
quanta of risk (or at least the increased uncertainty of risk) posed by these
groups. One such method was termed "rating up" of under average lives,
an intuitive procedure by which insurers notionally added some number of
years to proposed lives that would compensate for their perceived
deficiencies in health and habits from those of good male lives of the same
age.' 9 In other words, insurers took their carefully calibrated demographic
scales and then crudely pressed their thumbs down on one side in order to
make them appear in balance.
Another method of reckoning with demographic uncertainty
involved the office of the marketer rather than the actuary. Rather than
investing the time and effort to attain systematic mortality data of select
populations with differing demographic profiles, insurers cannily shunted
higher-risk lives into endowment insurance or contingent debt policies,
which provided a financial inducement to purchasers to live long.2 0 These
14 CLARK, supra note 13, at 72; see also FREDERICK BLAYNEY, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON LIFE ASSURANCE 5-6 (2nd ed. 1837).
15 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 16.
6 Id. at 9.
'7 DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY UPON PROJECTS 70 (BiblioBazaar 2008) (1697).
18 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 116-18.
'
9 Id. at 116-17.
20Id. at 195-96.
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highly successful marketing devices transferred some demographic risk
from the firm to the consumer, who effectively bet on his or her own
longevity, a speculative atavism from eighteenth-century life insurance.2 '
This speculative dimension of life insurance was also carried into
the nineteenth century through the bonus system, another device popular
with the public in which companies periodically distributed accumulated
excess premiums among policyholders.22 The insurance bonus generated
demand by giving life insurance the appearance of paying dividends in the
medium term like other investments. It also reflected firms' enduring
caution in relying too heavily on actuarial data, and their corresponding
conservatism in maintaining premiums above their true value, again, an
approach characteristic of eighteenth-century life insurance companies. 24
A third noteworthy thread of continuity pertains to the medical
screening of lives proposed for insurance. The fact that insurers in the
Victorian era ultimately limited their use of medical surveillance,
acquiescing in the face of market competition to regard as acceptable lives
deemed "normal enough," recall the loose and intuitive (although
admittedly less discriminating) classification of insurable lives in the
eighteenth century as those drawn from a broadly defined prime of life and
not obviously infirm or besotted.25
One of those lives rejected by insurance offices belonged to Robert
Louis Stevenson, whose "crazy health," as he himself described it, made
him absolutely uninsurable. 26 (The offices proved right: he died aged 44.)27
But Stevenson did live long enough to exact some literary revenge in a
novella he wrote with Lloyd Osbourne titled The Wrong Box, , a comedy of
errors about the maniacal winding up of a tontine.28 One of the book's
central characters is an insufferable pedant and middle-class improver
named Joseph Finsbury, the author of several edifying essays including
"'Life Insurance Regarded in its Relation to the Masses', read before the
Working Men's Mutual Improvement Society, Isle of Dogs, . . . [and ]
received with a 'literal ovation' by an unintelligent audience of both
21 Id. at 198-99.22 Id. at 166-69.
23 Id. at 177-80.
24 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 178-79.
" Id. at 249.
26 at 11.
27 A Robert Louis Stevenson Timeline, http://www.robert-louis-
stevenson.org/timeline (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
28 ROBERT L. STEVENSON AND LLOYD OSBOURNE, THE WRONG Box (Charles
Scribner's Sons 1889) (1889).
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sexes."29  Stevenson's caricature of the middle class's moralistic
condescension in recommending the manifold benefits of life insurance, as
well as the working class's uncomprehending assent to professional
expertise and numerical authority, has a recognizable basis in Alborn's
description of the social dynamics of Victorian life insurance. Many
companies - not least the growing cadre of "industrial" offices - moved
down market to enlist the multitude of laboring families in the cause of
financial improvement and social respectability. Alborn also demonstrates
that the mathematical basis of insurance - its legitimating scientific
foundation - was roundly ignored by customers who were swayed much
more by emotional appeals than by the calculus of mortality, whose
authority they uncritically accepted.
Finally, Stevenson's hilarious juxtaposition of Finsbury's vaunting
praise of life insurance with its tepid reception by his audience suggests
something about the limitations of insurance to subject people's lives to its
manifold controls.3 2 Alborn not only describes the difficulty of bending all
parts of the insurance bureaucracy towards a common goal, he observes
that the objects of that bureaucratic control evaded or transcended the
categories into which the insurance industry tried to place them. Despite
the implication of its title, Regulated Lives is in fact an optimistic book.
Optimistic, because it suggests that the widely feared totalizing capabilities
of modem financial and bureaucratic institutions is exaggerated and that
insurance companies, however grandiose their real or imagined ambitions,
are too compromised from within and too vulnerable to rivals from without
to exert too exact a control over our bodies and our lives. This is an insight
well worth celebrating, along with this superb book.
29 Id. at 4-5.
30 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 193.
31 Id. at 129.
32 See STEVENSON AND OSBOURNE, supra note 29, at 33-34.
33 See ALBORN, supra note 1, at 298-300.
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Timothy Alborn'
To repeat one of the acknowledgements in my book, I wish to
thank the University of Connecticut School of Law for so directly shaping
the direction Regulated Lives took as it evolved over the past decade; and
more specifically, in this case, for sponsoring such a stimulating (and
flattering) discussion of my book earlier this year. (That panel discussion,
which was the genesis of the three reviews to which I've been asked to
respond, also featured stimulating comments from Tom Baker and Patricia
McCoy, the past and present directors of the Insurance Law Center.) The
privilege of responding to such incisive reviews accompanies several
opportunities: to rethink imperfections in execution, to elaborate on some
unfinished business, and to smuggle in a few historical "out-takes" that will
assist me in carrying out the first two tasks.
To start with the book's title, Regulated Lives. All three reviewers
imply, more or less directly, that this title is not quite right, since the
insured lives discussed therein were not quite regulated. As Sharon
Murphy points out, actuaries did not know as much as they often claimed
regarding the statistical laws dictating morality; as Geoffrey Clark points
out, medical screening techniques often had more in common with the
eighteenth-century gatekeeping devices he describes in Betting on Lives
than with obviously "modern" diagnostic methods; and as Jill Anderson
points out, the title Regulated Lives implies a book about "the activities of
living" but in fact contains a more ambiguous "typology of life-senses."
Sharon Murphy made a similar point more critically in her review of my
book for EH.net: "the voice of the insuring consumer is largely absent,
appearing only as reflected by the firms themselves."'
So is there a meaningful sense in which the lives discussed in this
book (however they might have been defined) were regulated? I would
argue that there is: namely, the large extent to which the various groups
who were involved in the industry thought they were engaging in forms of
regulation, and-even when they consciously fell short of their
aspirations-kept trying to do so for most of the nineteenth century. The
Timothy Alborn is a professor at the City University of New York, Lehman
College, and is the author of Regulated Lives: Life Insurance and British Society
1800-1914.
1 Sharon Ann Murphy, review of TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED
LIVES: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH SOCIETY, 1800-914, EH.net
(http://eh.net/bookreviews/).
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search for a hoped-for "law of mortality" lurked in actuarial papers into the
1880s, and doctors continued to insist that their careful medical
examinations were vital to the success of life insurance, in the face of
mounting evidence that they made little difference. In their persistent
ambition to regulate their customers' lives, the actuaries and doctors in my
book represented a very significant break with Clark's eighteenth-century
actors. In the process, they contributed to an increasingly regulatory
culture, albeit one whose reach has often been exaggerated.
In the realm of statistics, a useful contrast can and should be drawn
between eighteenth-century demographic thought, which (as Clark states in
Betting on Lives) "did not possess the immediate and overwhelming
persuasiveness that many historians have attributed to statistical
knowledge" (118),2 and a nineteenth-century belief in a "law of mortality"
that hovered between religious faith and scientific certainty. As Murphy
points out, there was a wide gap between this belief and what was
statistically possible for much of the century (although not as wide as she
implies, since the tables they used adequately corrected for the inclusion of
lower-income individuals). Some of this actuarial hubris derived from the
training of nineteenth-century insurance technicians, which tended towards
astronomy and mathematical physics: Augustus De Morgan and Benjamin
Gompertz (to cite two examples) extended the order they saw in the
heavens to the human populations who bought life insurance. Some of it,
as I point out in my book, derived from the marriage of convenience
between this sincere form of certainty and the more dodgy variety
expressed by salesmen, who were eager to use the scientific basis of life
insurance to divert policyholders' attention from the periodic waves of
severe uncertainty that enveloped its financial side.
Medical practice in the nineteenth century, especially prior to the
"therapeutic revolution" just before the century's end, fell famously short
of what anyone would define as "modem medicine." Hence it comes as no
surprise that medical surveillance in life insurance recalled what Clark calls
the "loose and intuitive" methods of an earlier era. Rather more surprising
is the extent to which life insurance companies insisted on medical
screening at all, given the discipline's modest diagnostic capacity and the
availability of actuarial fixes (endowment policies and contingent debt
schemes) that rendered medical exams largely unnecessary. An
explanation for this puzzle, as Murphy implies, lies in the strange mixture
of hubris and paranoia on the part of company directors. With prominent
2 GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN
ENGLAND, 1695-1775, 118 (1999).
[Vol. 16.2
AUTHOR RESPONSE: REGULATED LIVES
London physicians whispering in their ears, companies set in motion a
proliferating arsenal of screening techniques between 1850 and 1920; at the
same time, they never retreated from their conviction that adverse selection
was a serious threat to their bottom line. Here again, I would argue, we
find a perverse desire to regulate (among doctors and directors alike) in the
face of evidence that these regulatory devices accomplished little beyond
scaring customers away.
Insurance salesmen often appear in my story as policyholders'
allies, who deflected the regulatory urge of actuaries, doctors, and
managers. They not only played the role of friend to the insured, they often
actually were friends of the insured-their wide circles of friends were why
they got the job in the first place. Hence we find them going to bat for
policyholders to reduce extra premiums, settle contested claims, and
otherwise soften the industry's unbending fagade. What I would add to this
story (and in keeping with my claim about a regulatory culture that
pervaded Victorian Britain) is the sheer volume of oppressively hot air that
these insurance agents added, bellows-like, to the Victorian tropes of
domestic duty and sentimental morality. Even though these salesmen
mostly preached to the converted, their message-multiplied thousands of
times over- added to a general Victorian culture that was ceaselessly
intent on teaching people how to improve their lives.
All this adds up to a distinctly regulatory culture in which the
whole (what Clark calls "the widely feared totalizing capabilities of
modem financial and bureaucratic institutions") is often a good deal less
than the sum of its parts. One very good reason for this, as I emphasize in
my book, was the fractured nature of expertise that comprises any
regulatory regime. The lives in my book achieved relative autonomy
precisely because they were subject to regulation by so many different
people. If one doctor didn't give candidates for insurance the answer they
was looking for, they could try another down the street. If one company
required a medical exam, would-be policyholders could try their luck with
another that was willing to substitute a double-or-nothing bet for a safer, if
more stringent, contract. This range of choices yielded a paradox, which
remains with us to this day in most avenues of modem life. Trust in
expertise has increased over time, in large part because consumers are able
to choose which experts to trust. For the same reason, trust in specific
groups of experts has diminished: witness any opinion poll reporting trust
in bankers, doctors, lawyers, and the like. These are still regulated lives-
just not overweeningly so.
For those who find this defense of my book's title unconvincing,
Jill Anderson has, at least, pointed to a possibly more accurate title waiting
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in the wings: Meanings of Life. Perhaps the least obvious meaning of life
that I described in Regulated Lives, but the one that (as Anderson shrewdly
observes) is at the core of life insurance, is life's opposite-namely, death.
Death, in more fancy terms, is life's "other," without which it would be
hard to pin down what it means to us. Anderson suggests that "we are
always looking at the death side of life." True enough, especially in
reference to this book-but among the other services that the various
meanings of life (commodification, medicalization, and so on) were called
on to perform, one of the most important was their capacity for distancing
the insured subject from having to tackle death head-on. We can start with
the obvious fact that the business is called life insurance, not death
insurance; and that society appears to have moved from less to more
euphemistic in this regard (sickness insurance has become health insurance,
and fire insurance has become homeowners insurance).
As one would expect, the commodification of life has always been
a handy expedient for distracting policyholders from the fact of their
ultimate demise, even as it deadens the activity of living. Translating death
into the prospect of financial reward performs the same basic alienating
function that is performed by translating labor into wages. Hence the
policyholders in Staring at the Sun were "entranced by the transaction"
whereby they got "the best deal out of being dead." 3 Here, in bold strokes
suitable to the edgy late-twentieth century tone of the novel, is the essence
of commodification, which is capable making death itself seem like an
entrancing opportunity. A Victorian take on the same phenomenon makes
the strangeness of this process even clearer: Elizabeth Gaskell, in
describing the human scenery of Yorkshire for her biography of Charlotte
Bronte, recounted that "West Riding men are sleuth-hounds in pursuit of
money," and demonstrated this axiom by referring to a small manufacturer
who "fell ill of an acute disease" shortly after buying an insurance policy.
When a doctor informed him of his "hopeless state," the man jumped for
joy, exclaiming: "By jingo!... I shall do the insurance company! I always
was a lucky fellow!"4
Here we have a nice illustration of what Clark calls "a speculative
atavism from eighteenth-century insurance"; though why we should think
of it as atavistic puzzles me, since speculation never disappeared as the
lifeblood of the financial industry. But Victorians had their limits, as well.
3 See TIMOTHY ALBORN, REGULATED LIVES: LIFE INSURANCE AND BRITISH
SOCIETY 1800-1914 311 (2009).
4 ELIZABETH GASKELL, THE LIFE OF CHARLOTTE BRONTE, 18 (Penguin Books,
1997).
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In this context it's worth lingering a bit longer on Clark's example of The
Wrong Box, which he uses to illustrate the revenge of the uninsurable (in
this case the sickly Robert Louis Stevenson). Victorian critics vilified the
book-not because it poked fun at the middle-class moralism associated
with life insurance, but because Stevenson refused to deviate sufficiently
from death. The book's sense of humor, according to one typical review,
was "revolting when one stays to consider for a moment its nauseating
subject-a corpse left unburied and unembalmed for several days, and
hustled here and there!" The reviewer concluded that "the whole book is in
unpardonably bad taste; its decency is less than the decency of savages."s
The balancing act between speculative allusions to death and "savage
decency" was one of the many fine lines life insurance companies needed
to walk in the nineteenth century. Viewed from a wider angle, the tension
between selling a sense of security and anticipating misfortune has
remained central to all forms of insurance down to the present time.
5 The Wrong Box, 20 THE LITERARY WORLD 236, 237 (1889).
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